The flow of migrants from theNorthern Triangle has reachedstaggering levels in the first months of 2021, spurred by an economic downturn, hopes that the BidenUMdministration will be more lenient on asylum seekers at the border and the continuedhigh levels of conflict and insecurity in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. While moderateprogress during the lastdecade hasaddressed one of the key drivers of migration –violence –there is stillmuch debate among political and development circles on themost effective methods to foster safer communities in Central America.
In this Q&UM, Enrique Roig, DirectorparaCreative’sCitizen Security Practice Area, eProject DirectorErik Alda, PhD, a criminologist with astrongfocus onmethodology anddata analysis, discusswhereviolence prevention initiatives are headed. Bringingone ofCreative’s past projects toin the region to bear, they examineo efficacy ofemploying a public health approach to reducing violence, using cost-benefit analysis methods to measureo programs’ success and their recommendations as a newNÓS. administration offers opportunities for development practitioners to re-engage inAmérica Central.
Can you give us a sense for what violence reduction methods have looked like in Central America and for what the U.S.’s policy is likely to be in the Northern Triangle moving forward?
Enrique: We know that the BidenUMdministration is very focused on corruption as an underlying driver for migration.Corruption is a systemic problem that affects every aspect of governance including economic growth and security.The White House NationalSecurityCouncil and State Departmenthave sent strong messagesregardingNÓS. government concerns. At the same time, drug trafficking and the role of criminal organizations continue topenetrate the political establishment. EmEl Salvador and Guatemala, there are strong concerns around politicization of the judiciarybranchand impunity for those implicated in corruption cases.
The NorthernTriangle has seen a reduction in homicides, though the rates remain high, disappearances have increased, extortion is rampant and gender-based violence is on the rise particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.Highrates of impunity for homicidesin the regionundermine law enforcement, weakening the deterrent effect for even the most minor offenses.Criminal justice resourcesare limited to begin with.
In some contexts, mano dura(heavy-handed) actions by police have been associated withshort-term reductions in overall violence, but they threaten the longer-term goals of violence reduction by fomenting distrust of security forces in high crime communities. There is still a significant knowledge gap in Latin America about how to deal with gangs and organized crime, which also leads to lack of clarity around the most effective use of resources to address these different phenomena.
What about the development community’s approach?
Enrique: The politicized, heavy-handed responses of governments that prioritize law and order is a global phenomenon that has done little to address the social inequities that lead to violence in the first place. We are having the wrong conversation about public safety – one that so far has been devoid of the evidence of what we know worksfrom public healthand the underlying root causes to violence and its connection to gun trafficking andcounter-narcotics strategy. See the CARSI report for the Drug Policy Commission: CARSI study.
But there is an opportunity now to have a new conversation, which will require a thoughtful, data driven approach that reimagines how we can address violence and safety effectively, one grounded in a common sense of purpose and solidarity across partisan divides.
This has been done before under the leadership of thenVice President Biden with a focus on strategies to balance policing with whole-of-community social programs to reduce violence in neighborhoods throughout cities in the Americas. We are moving in this direction in the United States and now is in the moment to do the same in the international development space.
With a clear body of research, data and implementation experience on evidence-based violence prevention and reduction programs, the developmentcommunitycanbetter guide investment of resourcestowardsclearer roles of responsibilities and outcome measures.
Given the complexity of these issues and the array of violence prevention methods, how do you measure crime and violence prevention projects’ impact?
Erik: There are many ways to rigorously measure the impact of acrime and violence prevention program, includingexperimental, quasi-experimental, and qualitative evaluations.USAID’sProponte Máé offers a good case study. In that project, we addressed violence primarily by strengthening families through family counseling in targeted hotspots in Honduras.
The programteamdesigned an impact evaluation to measure the validity of thefamily intervention model and our efficacy in violence prevention. Youth were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups and both groups underwent the IMC assessment. The treatment group received the six-month counseling program while the control group awaited treatment until both groups were re-evaluated using the IMC-R to measure results or changes after the six-month period.
The evaluation determined significantreduction inrisk factoré:
- After completing six-month counseling program, 78.1 por cento (250 of 320) of youth who began treatment at a secondary level of risk reduced their risk levels to a primary level;
- 20 por cento (64) remained at the same level of risk;
- 1.9 por cento increased to a tertiary level of risk by self-reporting as belonging to a group that engages in criminal behavior;
- Of the 52 youth who began treatment at a tertiary level of risk, 53.8 por cento (28) reduced their risk levels to a primary level of risk. Not only did the number of risk factors drop, they no longer self-reported belonging to a group that engages in criminal behavior;
- 26.8 por cento (14 youth) no longer reported belonging to criminal groups but showed no reduction in the number of risk factors, and therefore remained at a secondary level of risk; 19.2% (10) of youth remained at a tertiary level of risk and reported as belonging to a criminal group and presented four or more risk factors.
Tell us about the cost-benefit analysis you conducted for Proponte Más.
Erik: In addition to the experimental evaluation, we conducted a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which is auseful tool to examine the economic impact ofviolence prevention programs.They require acomprehensive examination ofo program, including its intended objectives, program operationalization and its costsethe benefits it yields to program participants and to society.
We modelled our CBA after the approach developed byCuesta and Alda(2021). It is a simpleCBA where we monetizedprogram benefits as the costsby the program. We particularlyfocused on costs avertedin health, criminal justice ethe economically productive lost yearsresulting from violence. Using a reasonable set of assumptions, we find thatProponte Máéyields societal benefits in terms of violence reduction. The overall dollarvalue of the benefits rage from $2 million to$19 milhão, depending on the model and the discount rate employed. The more conservative modelyielded lower, yet still positive, benefits, whereas the less conservative model yielded larger benefits.These results where corroborated by additional, robustchecks using differentscenarios.
What did the results of your cost-benefit analysis reveal about the effectiveness of violence prevention interventions?
Enrique: We conducted a cost-benefit analysis ofProponte Máé to examinewhether program benefits outweighed its costs.As noted above, we found that the social benefits in terms of violence reduction and migrationprevention outweighedoverallprogram costs. In addition to theimpact evaluation findings, the cost-benefit analysis exercise suggeststhat programs that focus on targeted prevention approaches are a sound investment.
The results of our study provide additional support toresearch showing that prevention approaches to violencefar outweigh the costs of reactive responses.Our findings are particularly relevantpara Central American countries where populist punitive strategies are still trending.
Erik: The evidence demonstrates thatin order to reduce group-inspired violence, the focus needs to be on changing behaviors as opposed to attacking group identity. Applying this epidemiological public health approach to CVP involves examining the factors that increase or decrease the risk for delinquent behaviors and identifying the protective factors that can be strengthened throughtargeted preventionintervenções.
It can be hard to see the impact of violence prevention projects on a macro-level, but can you speak to their success in communities and the part they play in broader efforts to promote prosperity in the region?
Enrique: The public health frameworkpara violence prevention was developed by the Centers for Disease Controleapplies an epidemiological approach by organizing responses to community violence based on a differentiated risk approach that focuses on places, people and behaviors. Using this approach, violence is treated as a disease, with careful diagnosis of those infected in hotspots, targeted interventions to interrupt transmission of violence, and preventive measures to keep those at risk from infection. This requires a focus on where violence is taking placeand individuals most likely to engage in delinquent activities.
While the evidence points in this direction in terms of targeting, it also potentially leads to abuses by law enforcement when certain communities are singled out and discriminated against given the violence dynamics. Navigating this scenario with a more public health approach is critical.
This is the kind of intervention we want to see more of in programs designed to bolster public safety and address underlying causes of migration inGuatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.
